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    This paper examines prudential regulation of a multinational bank (MNB hereafter) and shows 
how regulatory intervention depends on the liability structure and insurance arrangements   
for non local depositors (i.e. on the representation form for foreign units). Shared liability   
among the MNB’s units gives higher incentives for regulatory intervention than when units are 
legally separate entities. Cross-border deposit insurance provides lower incentives to intervene 
than when the regulator only has to compensate local depositors. We study the impact of   
shared liability and deposit insurance arrangements on regulators’ incentives to monitor and 
acquire information on MNB’s activities. Furthermore, by describing regulatory intervention   
and monitoring we also draw implications on the MNB’s preferences over the form representation 
for foreign units, and discuss the effects of regulators’ behavior on both MNB’s lobbying and 
international resources shifting. 
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The rapid expansion of multinational banks (MNBs hereafter) represents a
source of new concerns for regulators. MNBs can easily take advantage of
ill-harmonized national supervisions. At the same time, regulation of a MNB
in one country may well a⁄ect the behavior of the bank and regulators in
other countries. This paper provides a simple framework to examine disci-
plining regulatory actions performed by independent national authorities in
a multinational bank setting.
Under current regulatory arrangements, branches of MNBs are supervised
by the regulator of the country of original incorporation ("home regulator"),
who is also in charge of insuring foreign depositors. Subsidiary-represented
MNBs are supervised instead by both home and foreign regulators, which
have independent regulatory power over the locally incorporated subsidiaries.
Depositors are normally insured by the local deposit insurance scheme.
We examine prudential regulation of a MNB, and discuss the extent to
which regulatory intervention depends on the representation form for foreign
units, i.e. on the liability structure and insurance arrangements for non local
depositors. We argue that national regulators￿incentives to intervene in a
bank unit will be a⁄ected by the assets available to compensate depositors
upon intervention, and on the regulators￿responsibilities towards depositors
located in foreign countries.
In particular, shared liability between the MNB￿ s unit reduces the cost of
intervention in any of the units in comparison with the scenario in which units
are legally separate, since the regulator can reduce the cost of intervention
in a given unit with assets of the other. At the same time responsibility
to insure depositors in both countries decreases incentives to intervene in
a given unit as compared with the case in which the regulator only has to
compensate local depositors. On the basis of these considerations we show
the following:
1. When the MNB is set up via a subsidiary, the home unit regulator has
a stronger incentive in restructuring MNB￿ s activities than the foreign
regulator. This occurs because the home regulator both bene￿ts from
the foreign unit￿ s (residual) assets, and is shielded from foreign losses.
No such e⁄ect is in place for the foreign regulator.
2. Home units fall under softer regulation in branch MNBs than with
subsidiary MNBs. This is a consequence of di⁄erent regulatory re-
Non-technical summary6
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sponsibility towards foreign depositors: the home regulator can access
foreign assets regardless of the representation form, whereas she has to
repay foreign depositors only when facing a branch MNB. Home assets
(possibly available only if the home unit is not intervened) are therefore
more valuable in branch MNBs than with subsidiary representation.
3. We compare the likelihood of intervention under the two representation
forms, and show that when the home unit￿ s activities are not very
safe, branch representation is preferred by the MNB as it induces more
lenient regulation over all units.
4. We study regulators￿incentives to collect information on the MNB￿ s
activities. We argue that when regulators decide whether to collect
information on the bank￿ s unit, strategic behavior for monitoring may
well appear in the form of postponing information acquisition on the
local unit.
5. We show that with the subsidiary representation form the foreign reg-
ulator has got more incentives to monitor foreign units than the home
regulator regarding the home unit.
6. In general, incentives to monitor are maximal with a branch rather
than with a subsidiary represented MNBs.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Multinational banking activities have signiﬁcantly expanded as barriers to both international cap-
ital ﬂows and to foreign market entry have decreased. 1 A multinational bank (MNB hereafter),
consisting of a home bank and a number of foreign located banks, can easily take advantage of
ill-harmonized national supervisions. Furthermore, regulation of a MNB in one country may well
aﬀect the behavior of the bank and regulators in other countries. As such, the rapid expansion
of MNBs represents a source of new concerns for regulators. This paper provides a simple frame-
work to examine disciplining regulatory actions performed by independent national authorities in
a multinational bank setting.
Bank expansion abroad occurs in many ways, mostly importantly with representation by way
of branches and subsidiaries.2 Representation form deﬁnes a liability structure between units,
and implies a regulatory structure for the MNB. The bank constitutes a single legal entity when
business abroad is conducted via branches, on the contrary, subsidiaries are separately incorporated
and capitalized entities. The home bank therefore shares joint liability with the branches for their
losses, while is shielded by limited liability from the subsidiary’s losses. At the same time the
subsidiary’s assets stand against home losses, as it is the case with branches. Representation form
also deﬁnes the competency of diﬀerent regulators, aﬀecting their incentives to collect information
and take disciplining regulatory actions (i.e. their incentives to intervene). Branches are supervised
by the regulator of the country of original incorporation ("home regulator"), who is also in charge of
insuring depositors (independently of their location). Subsidiary MNBs, on the contrary, are jointly
supervised by the home and foreign regulators. The foreign regulator has independent regulatory
power over the locally incorporated subsidiary and depositors are normally insured by the local
deposit insurance scheme.3
In this paper, we analyse regulators’ incentives to collect information and take disciplining
regulatory actions in the MNB’s units and we relate this analysis to the MNB’s representation
form. Furthermore, we examine regulators’ responsiveness to information available on the MNB’s
activities. We take an MNB that operates in two countries, and conducts business in the foreign
country either via branches or via subsidiaries. The MNB collects money from depositors in the
two countries and invests it locally. In our model, troubled banks are too slow to cut their losses
because they are protected by limited liability. They therefore keep alive projects that should
be liquidated. Due to deposit insurance, the bank’ s ultimate creditors are the taxpayers. This
1By 1996, the total assets held by US banks ’overseas units was twice that in 1992, exceeding 1.1 trillion. In 2000,
foreign banks accounted for almost 10 percent of US deposits (Buch and Golder 2001). In 2001, foreign banks located
in the US accounted for 20 percent of total banks’ assets in the US, and 26 percent of total business loans in the US
(Federal Reserve Board, 2002). In emerging markets the surge of multinational banks is even more spectacular. In
Central Europe the proportion of total bank assets controlled by foreign-owned banks rose from 8 percent in 1994
to 59 percent in 1999. In certain Latin American countries, as of 2000, almost 50 percent of total bank assets are
controlled by foreign banks (IMF, 2000). For more details, see Calzolari and Loranth (2001).
2Other representation forms exist (e.g. correspondent banks, representative oﬃces and agencies). We limit at-
t e n t i o nt ob r a n c h e so rs u b s i d i a r i e sb e c ause these representations allow banks to perform the full range of banking
activities.
3For more details see Houpt 1999 and Bain et al. 2003.
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or part of their operations. However, intervention is an imperfect remedy because regulators do not
posses all relevant information. A regulator intervening in a bank might stop valuable investments,
or, alternatively, might allow continuation of bad projects.
In our base model we assume that regulators only care about costs coming from their deposit
insurer function. The trade-oﬀ the regulator faces is as follows: early intervention yields a sure cost
that might be avoided by waiting until the investment matures and gives suﬃcient returns to pay
out depositors. Waiting, however, might lead to no returns and a substantially higher cost for the
regulator.
We show that a material diﬀerence exists in the likelihood of intervention in branch and in
subsidiary MNBs. This diﬀerence arises from (1) the diﬀerence in assets available to compensate
depositors upon intervention; and (2) the diﬀerences in regulators’ responsibilities towards deposi-
tors located in the other country. Shared liability among the MNB’s unit gives higher incentives for
regulatory intervention than when units are legally separate, since the regulator can reduce the cost
of intervention in a given unit with assets of the other. At the same time, however, responsibility
to insure depositors in both countries decreases incentives to intervene in a given unit as compared
when the regulator only has to compensate local depositors. In fact, when insuring both countries’
depositors, intervention in a given unit eliminates the possibility for the regulator to (partially)
cover potential losses of the other unit, thus making intervention more costly.
On the base of these considerations we obtain several implications concerning regulators’ be-
havior.
First, when the MNB is setup via subsidiary, the home unit regulator is tougher than the
foreign unit regulator (i.e. the home regulator intervenes in the home unit for a larger parameter
set than the foreign regulator in the unit abroad). This occurs because the home unit regulator
both beneﬁts from the (residual) asset of the foreign unit and is shielded from foreign losses. No
such eﬀect is in place for the foreign regulator. Furthermore, the subsidiary’s liability over home
losses implies that softer foreign regulation (i.e. no intervention) induces tougher regulation at
home.
Second, home banks fall under softer regulation in branch MNBs in comparison with subsidiary
MNBs. This is a consequence of diﬀerent regulatory responsibility towards foreign depositors. In
fact, the home regulator can access foreign assets independent of the representation form. On
the contrary, she has to repay foreign depositors only when facing a branch MNB,so that, to this
purpose, home assets (possibly available only if the home unit is not intervened) are more valuable
than with subsidiary representation.
Third, we ﬁnd that intervention in the foreign unit in branch MNBs is more likely if the
prospects on the home unit look good than if they look bad. This is the result of two forces.
The shared liability between the MNB’s unit reduces the cost of intervention in any of the units.
However, intervening in a given unit eliminates the possibility of using that unit to subsidize losses
in the other unit, thereby increasing the expected cost of reimbursing depositors. The ﬁrst eﬀect
pushes the regulator towards tougher behavior, while the second towards a softer behavior on a
branch. The balance of these two eﬀects changes as prospects for the home unit changes. When
8
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relevant, making the home regulator softer on the foreign unit. As home prospects improve, the
ﬁrst eﬀect becomes stronger and the result follows. Note that, the home and the foreign units are
symmetric for the regulator of a branch MNB so that better or worse prospects about the other
unit have the same eﬀect on the decision concerning the home unit. Furthermore, being based
on units joint liability, it clearly also applies to the decision concerning the home bank in case of
subsidiary MNB. Hence, we can generalize the result and state that good news (better prospects)
for any unit leads to stricter regulation on the other unit, as long as units are jointly liable for their
losses. This implies that irrespective of the MNB’s representation, good news about the foreign
unit leads to more regulatory intervention in the home unit.
Furthermore, given that in subsidiary represented MNBs the decision of the foreign regulator
is independent of the home prospects (the home bank is shielded by limited liability from the
subsidiary losses), it also follows that the subsidiary faces softer regulation than the branch for
good home prospects and tougher regulation for bad home prospects.
The above comparison of regulatory intervention in the two units lends to the representation
form choice by the MNB since the diﬀerent regulatory regime the bank faces is allegedly an input
in making that decision (Houpt, 1999, Calzolari and Loranth, 2001). By comparing the likelihood
of intervention under the two representation forms we can show that when the home unit’s project
is not very good (not very safe), the branch representation is preferred as it induces more lenient
regulation over all units. When this is not the case, the relative safety of home project with respect
to the foreign project drives the decision. When the former is safer, the banker prefers subsidiary
representation, otherwise, the reverse is true.
We then extend the base model in two directions. First, we examine what happens to regulators’
behavior if they also care about the MNB’s proﬁts (e.g. as a consequence of lobbying by the MNB).
Second, we assign an active role to bank managers, assuming that in the absence of intervention
they gamble for resurrection. More precisely, by ineﬃciently shifting resources between units, the
MNB may expect proﬁt even from a bad unit. Joint liability in branch MNBs means that failure of
any unit will bring down the other unit. Thus, a well performing unit has incentives to inject funds
into a poorly performing unit. For subsidiary MNBs, however, the home unit can let a foreign unit
fail without failing itself. The home unit therefore has lower incentives to keep it unduly aﬂoat.4
In both extensions, contrary to the base model, the foreign regulator of the subsidiary is now
aﬀected by the home regulator’s decision. No intervention at home allows the MNB to gamble,
i.e. for a good home unit to sink funds into a bad foreign unit. This increases the probability that
the foreign regulator incurs no cost if she does not intervene in the local unit. Thus, the foreign
regulator is induced to being softer. We show that with both extensions if the additional eﬀects have
limited impact on regulator’s payoﬀ, then the home regulator prefers to take the opposite decision
of the foreign regulator as in the base model, while the foreign regulator is inclined to take the same
decision as the home regulator. Thus, in this case regulatory decisions tend to cyclically aﬀect each
4This is related to Kahn and Winton (2003) who examine the impact of organisational structure of banks on
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On the contrary, when the MNB’s proﬁts and gambling have a large impact on the home regulator
payoﬀs, she tends to intervene less often, given no intervention abroad. A region of multiple
equilibria then appears in both extensions, where softer regulation triggers softer regulation, and
tougher regulation triggers tougher regulation.
Finally, we study regulators’ incentives to collect information on the MNB’s activities. We
add a preceding stage to the game, where regulators decide whether to collect information on
the bank’s unit. Strategic behavior for monitoring may well appear in the form of postponing
information acquisition on the local unit. We show that with subsidiary representation the foreign
regulator has more incentives to monitor the foreign unit than the home regulator does the home
unit. Further, incentives to monitor are maximal with a branch rather than with a subsidiary
MNB.
Related literature Our paper belongs to a growing literature on MNB regulation. Calzolari
and Loranth (2001) provide a general introduction to the issue. Repullo (2001) addresses limited
supervisory information about MNB’s foreign activities and draws conclusions on cross-border
takeovers. Holthausen and Rønde (2002) examine informational problems in branch represented
MNBs, and show that the ﬁrst best closure decisions cannot be implemented if national regulators
have private local knowledge, due to divergent national interests. Acharya (2002) studies the
interaction between capital requirements and closure policy. He argues that the cross-border
harmonization of capital requirements with divergent closure policies leads to a regression towards
the most forbearing closure regime. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2001) reach similar conclusions to
Acharya’s paper. Dalen and Olsen (2003) study the lack of coordination among national regulators
when the MNB is represented with subsidiaries. They show that independent national regulation
lowers capital adequacy requirements which is oﬀset by an increase of bank asset quality. Finally,
Harr and Rønde (2004) examine optimal capital requirements for branches and subsidiaries in a
model where the bank’s asset choice depends both on exogenous factors and on the representation
form.5
With respect to this literature, our contribution is to analyze and compare regulators’ incentives
to take disciplining regulatory actions and to monitor under branches and subsidiaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the base model. Section 3
analyzes and compares regulators’ incentive to intervene under the two representations. Section 4
extends the base model to regulators who also care about the MNB’s proﬁt. Section 5 considers the
role of active bank managers that may gamble for resurrection. Section 6 deals with information
acquisition. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.




Working Paper Series No. 431
January 20052 The base model
Consider a MNB incorporated in country h (the home country) and represented in country f (the
foreign country). The MNB operates with two units, one in each country.
Investment Opportunities. At t =0the bank raises one unit of deposits in each country.
Deposits are fully insured and pay an interest rate that is normalized to zero. Each unit i = f,h
has access to a risky project that requires one unit of investment. At t =0project i is successful
with probability p, in which case it pays R at t =2 . It fails with probability (1 − p),p a y i n g0.A
project can be liquidated at t =1 , yielding L ∈ [0,1).
We assume that ex-ante projects have a positive NPV, that is,
Assumption 1 pR +( 1− p)L>1.
Moreover, (i) depositors in a given country are fully paid back if the local project is successful,
but (ii) if one project is liquidated or fails, the MNB cannot reimburse depositors in both countries,
independently of the other project’s realization.6 That is,
Assumption 2 (i) R>1,( i i )R + L<2.
The MNB is run by a bank manager with preferences to carry out projects in both countries,
and having no incentive to stop projects before the termination date t =2 .T h i si ss oe v e ni ft h e
manager learns by t = 1 that a project will fail at t =2 . For example, a wage scheme related to the
MNB’s performance (proﬁt) and the presence of managerial private beneﬁts induce this manager’s
behavior. Hence, manager’s preferences to continue ineﬃcient projects calls for bank regulation.7
Bank Regulation. In the base model regulators perform two tasks: prudential regulation
and deposit insurance. Prudential regulation comprises of (early) intervention at t =1 , indicated
as I. This is tantamount to liquidation of the unit’s ongoing project. Intervention, more generally,
can be thought of as conservatorship, or ring-fencing, as an attempt to protect the assets of a given
unit, or to limit the exposure of the MNB to certain categories of risk. It can also be understood
as asset restrictions imposed by the regulator, or assets restructuring. Alternatively, the regulator
may decide not to intervene in a project, which we will indicate with O (for open).
Regulators are assumed to minimize the costs from their deposit insurer function.8 In Section
4 we will discuss the model extension whereby regulators also care about the MNB’s proﬁts.
6This is to avoid uninteresting behavior of regulators.
7For a contract theory explanation see Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, among the others. Also note that anticipating
regulators’ decisions, the manager may prefer to run only one project. However, our aim is to study a MNB active
in both countries. To this end, we implicitly assume information available at t =0induces the manager to run both
projects, even if at a later date new information may make this decision suboptimal. This will be discussed in Section
5.
8The FDIC has been given this type of objective function by the FDICIA in 1992. The act mandated a least-cost
resolution method and prompt resolution approach to problems and failing banks. The Financial Service Authority
(FSA) in the UK shares a similar mission. In the academic literature this objective function has been used by Mailath
and Mester (1994), Repullo (2000, 2001), among others.
11
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 431
January 2005Representation form. We examine two representation forms for the foreign unit: subsidiary
and branch. As discussed above, the representation form deﬁnes a liability structure for the MNB,
and implies an allocation of supervisory powers between national regulators.
Af o r e i g nsubsidiary is a separately incorporated entity in the foreign country. Subsidiaries
and the home bank share liability for the home banks’ losses, but the home bank is not liable for
the losses of the subsidiary. More precisely, in case of home failure all remaining assets in a solvent
foreign unit - after foreign depositors are paid out - should be used against home liabilities. No such
transfer is legally required from a solvent home unit to an insolvent foreign unit. With a subsidiary-
organized MNB (subsidiary-MNB hereafter), each national regulator performs prudential regulation
over the MNB’s local unit and insures local depositors. Regulators’ decisions are assumed to be
taken non-cooperatively.
Branches can be thought of as extensions of the mother bank. As such, insolvency occurs
when the total assets of the MNB fall short of total liabilities. With a branch-organized MNB
(branch-MNB hereafter) the home regulator performs prudential regulation and deposit insurance
in both countries. Intervention in both units can be thought of as closure of the MNB, yielding
liquidation value 2L.9
In what follows we refer to the regulator in charge by her location. Thus, we refer to the
single regulator of a branch MNB as well as that of the home unit in subsidiary MNBs as the
home regulator. We call the regulator of the foreign unit in subsidiary MNBs foreign regulator.
Furthermore, by convention, for any pair of decisions, the ﬁrst letter refers to unit h and the second
to unit f,e . g . (I,O) means that the regulator in charge of unit h intervenes, whilst the one in
charge of unit f does not.
The following table summarizes the regulators’ activities over the MNB’s units according to
the representation form, as well as the liability structure.


































Table 1: Representation, Supervision and Liability with Branch- and Subsidiary-MNBs
Information Structure. At t =0 , the regulators and the bank share the same view about
the projects’ prospects. They therefore both hold p as the probability of success. In order to have
9The current EU regulation follows the principle of home country supervision. Hence, the competent authority
supervising the bank is the country where the bank has received its license. Supervisory responsibilities cover the
activities which are carried out in the form of branches throughout the EU or by cross-border supply of services. See
the Second EU Banking Coordination Directive issued in 1989 and made eﬀective on January 1, 1993.
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both units independent of the representation form. At t =1regulators may obtain a signal about
the local unit’s prospects and we assume that any information acquired by a regulator at t =1is
shared with the other regulator. Given this signal on project i, at t =1the regulators’ beliefs on
the success probability of project i become pi. A favorable signal for project i means that pi ≥ p,
while the inequality is reversed for unfavorable signals. At t =2all information about project
returns becomes public.
In this base model, information acquisition is an exogenous process. We will endogenize it in
Section 6 by investigating the regulators’ incentives to monitor a bank’s units.
We summarize our base model with the following,
Timing
• At t =0:The bank collects deposits in both countries and invests them in risky projects.
• At t =1:Regulators exchange any information they have learned about the local unit.
Regulators decide whether to intervene in the project of the unit under their jurisdiction.
• At t =2:Payoﬀs are realized and depositors are repaid.
3 Prudential regulation and representation form
The trade-oﬀ for a cost-minimizing regulator of a single unit bank is as follows: early intervention
at t =1leads to a sure (intervention) cost of (1 − L). This might be avoided by waiting until the
unit’s project matures (if it yields returns R). Waiting until t =2 , however, might yield no returns,
and a regulatory cost of 1 (i.e. returning the initial deposit). The regulator therefore compares the
liquidation value L with the probability of success for a given unit pi.10 This basic trade-oﬀ will
change in a multi-unit setup due to the joint liability between the MNB’s units.
3.1 Subsidiary represented MNB
At t =2no strategic interaction takes place between regulators. If the local unit is solvent, the
regulator in charge incurs no cost. Otherwise, she covers the shortfall between available assets and
liabilities.
At t =1limited liability of the home unit makes it impossible to reduce foreign asset shortfall
with assets located in the home unit. Hence, the home regulator’s decision leaves the foreign
regulator’s payoﬀ unaﬀected. It follows that the foreign regulator has a dominant strategy: she
prefers intervention in the subsidiary if the liquidation value L is larger than the expected cost
reduction obtained by leaving the subsidiary open pf.
The situation is diﬀerent for the home regulator. If the foreign unit is successful at t =2 , the
home regulator could reduce her intervention cost, (1 − L), with assets from the foreign unit, once
10Intervention at t =1leads to (1 − L). No intervention results in no cost with probability pf, and cost of 1 with
probability (1 − pf).
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can be transferred to the home unit . Hence, the optimal decision for the home regulator depends
on the foreign regulator. More precisely, if the foreign regulator intervenes, home intervention is
optimal if ph ≤ L. If the foreign regulator does not intervene, the home regulator intervenes if the
liquidation value L is larger than ph − phpf(R − 1) or, ph ≤ δh where δh ≡ L
1−pf(R−1).
It is immediate to see that the home regulator tends to be tougher with the home unit (i.e. to
close it more often or for a larger set of parameters) when the foreign regulator does not intervene
in the subsidiary. If the foreign regulator does not intervene in the subsidiary, the home regulator
beneﬁts from the residual assets of a successful subsidiary. Her expected cost for any decision will
be lower now. However, the reduction in expected cost is higher when she intervenes pf(R − 1)
than when she does not (1−ph)pf(R−1). When she intervenes, conditional on the foreign project
being successful, she will beneﬁt from the foreign assets. If she prefers continuation for the home
unit, she beneﬁts only upon failure. The combination of the regulators’ decisions allows us to draw
the following pictures where we describe the unique (pure strategy) equilibrium decisions for any
pair of probabilities (ph,p f).
For the same prospects concerning the two projects (i.e. for ph,p f along the 45◦ degree line),
either the two regulators’ decisions coincide (i.e. (I,I) or (O,O)), or the home regulator intervenes
while the foreign regulator does not. The reason, as explained before, lies in the subsidiary’s joint
liability with the home unit for home losses. This leads to the following proposition: (where softer
regulation implies keeping a given unit open, while the reverse holds for tougher regulation).
Proposition 1 (Interacting Regulators with Subsidiary MNB) With subsidiary represen-
tation, (i) softer foreign regulation induces tougher home regulation; (ii) ceteris paribus, the home
regulator is tougher than the foreign one.
A more favorable signal on the home project (i.e. ph ≥ p) always induces the home regulator
to be more lenient. Clearly, the home regulator expects smaller costs in letting the home unit
continue. Moreover, the foreign regulator’s decision is unaﬀected, as she cannot beneﬁtf r o ma n y
home-located residual asset. Similarly, a more favorable signal on the foreign project (i.e. pf ≥ p)
induces more lenient behavior from the foreign regulator. The home regulator may, however, change
her decision from continuation to intervention in this case, as shown by the increasing boundary
δh separating decisions (O,O) from (I,O) in ﬁgure 1.
Proposition 2 (Eﬀect of Information with Subsidiary MNB) In case newly available in-
formation at t =1aﬀects decisions, a more favorable signal on the foreign unit induces the home
regulator to be tougher. In all other cases, favorable signals induce softer regulation. The eﬀects of
signals are reversed when they are unfavorable.
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she intervenes, or if the home unit project gives no returns. However, good news about project f has
a stronger impact on the payoﬀ associated with intervention than with no intervention. Therefore,
it may induce intervention in the home unit.11 Since, the foreign regulator cannot recover any
resource from the home unit, this information eﬀect does not apply to her behavior.
In section 4 we show that even if the home regulator cares about the MNB’s proﬁts, the
proposition still stands as long as she values proﬁt less than costs.
3.2 Branch represented MNB
With a branch MNB, the home regulator, if necessary, pays the diﬀerence between the total liabil-
ities and the total assets of the MNB at t =2 .A tt =1the home regulator’s decision comprises of
intervention in one, both or none of the two units.
Joint liability of the MNB’s units means that decisions concerning a given unit aﬀect decisions
about the other unit, and the regulator internalizes the cost of intervention in any unit being in
charge of depositors in both countries. If the regulator intervenes in unit j, unit i c a no n l yr e l yo n
its own assets. Furthermore, a successful project in unit i not only pays back depositors in country
i, but also reduces the regulator’s cost in country j by (R − 1).12 Thus, she prefers intervention if
the liquidation value L is larger than the expected return piR.
If pj is close to zero, intervening in j or not has essentially the same eﬀect on the decision
concerning unit i. This decision is diﬀerent when pj is suﬃciently larger than zero. As units are
jointly liable, the regulator can reduce her intervention cost in country i with the residual assets in
country j if j is allowed to continue and subsequently successful. The better the prospects on unit
j, the higher pi is needed to avoid intervention in unit i.13 The reason is the same as for the home
regulator’s decision in a subsidiary represented MNB. If the regulator intervenes in unit i,s h ei n c u r s
ac o s t(1 − L), and can expect pj(R − 1) − (1 − pj) from unit j . With no intervention, the same
payoﬀ from the foreign unit can only be expected if project i fails, with probability (1 − pi) ≤ 1.
This is why when unit j is kept open, unit i is also kept open only if pi ≥ ϕi ≡ L
R−2(R−1)pj, where
ϕi is increasing in pj. Hence, if pi ≥ ϕi for both units (i.e. i = h,f) no intervention takes place at
all. For pj >L / Rbut pi <ϕ i (together with pj >p i, see the previous note) intervention occurs in
unit i while no intervention takes place in unit j.
The following ﬁgure describes the regions with associated optimal decisions for all values of
success probabilities (ph,p f).
11Note that the foreign resources the home regulator can seize are "truncated" in case of success of the home
project for regulators are cost minimizers in this base model.
12Recall that whenever the regulator intervenes, assets in the local unit fall short of liabilities, thus she incurs a
cost.
13We are implicitly considering pj ≥ pi,s i n c ei fpj <p i the regulator would never close unit i and leave open unit j.
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MNB. This happens in (the black) region (I,I).I fp r o j e c tf has low probability of success while
project h has suﬃciently high probability of success, the optimal decision turns out to be (O,I)
(the dashed area with vertical lines). Similarly, if project h has low probability of success while
project f has suﬃciently high probability of success, the optimal decision is (I,O) (the dashed area
with horizontal lines). When the projects’ prospects are similar and suﬃciently good, the regulator
may prefer to leave both units open with decision (O,O) (the white area). The regulator’s decision
process is symmetric with respect to the two projects. Hence, along the 45◦ degree lines, either the
decisions are the same, or, the regulator is indiﬀerent between (I,O) and (O,I).
As units are jointly liable in branch MNBs, new information on a given unit always aﬀects the
regulator’s costs associated with the decisions over the other unit. Proposition 3 summarizes the
information eﬀect on a branch-MNB.
Proposition 3 (Eﬀe c to fI n f o r m a t i o nw i t hB r a n c hM N B )Signals improving the prospect of
a given project induce the regulator to be softer on that unit but tougher on the other. Similarly,
poorer prospects induce the regulator to be tougher on the given unit but softer on the other.
This result is a direct consequence of boundary ϕi being an increasing function of pj.T h e
intuition for this result is the same we gave for the behavior of the home regulator in subsidiary
represented MNBs. A higher pj lowers the regulator’s expected cost on the other unit for each
possible decision. However, the reduction of those costs is higher with intervention than with
continuation.
3.3 Comparing Prudential Regulation between Subsidiary and Branch-MNBs
We now compare prudential regulation taking place at t =1under the two representation forms.
As we have discussed, regulatory decisions in branch versus subsidiary represented MNBs diﬀer
because of two main reasons:
(1) The amount of assets available to compensate depositors upon intervention. The foreign
regulator of a subsidiary-MNB cannot access the assets located in the home country. Thus, she
bears the full cost of an intervention in the foreign unit. The home regulator of a subsidiary-MNB,
and that in a branch MNB, however, can beneﬁt from the (residual) assets located in the foreign
country.
(2) Regulators’ responsibilities towards foreign depositors. In subsidiary-MNBs national regula-
tors are only responsible for claims in their country, and local depositors are senior for local assets.
For branch MNBs, however, the home regulator performs the deposit insurance function in both
countries.
These diﬀerences lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Subsidiary and Branch: Comparison of Regulations) The home unit is
subject to (weakly) softer regulation with branch than subsidiary representation. The foreign
unit is subject to (weakly) softer regulation with branch than subsidiary representation if ph ≤
max{L,1/2}, and to (weakly) tougher regulation otherwise.
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subsidiary MNBs, if the regulator in charge intervenes in unit j, the regulator of the other unit
i bears no responsibility towards depositors located in country j. Thus, the regulator of unit i
compares the liquidation value L from intervention in i with the expected cost saving pi from no
intervention. The regulator of a branch-MNB, however, knows that she may be able to reduce the
cost arising from the liquidated unit j (i.e. 1 − L) with the assets of unit i (i.e. thus obtaining an
additional ph(R − 1) − (1 − ph)). Thus, she compares L with piR (>p i). Hence, for intervention
in a given unit, the regulator in charge for the other unit is softer under branch than subsidiary
representation.
Assume now that no intervention takes place in the foreign unit. We analyze the decision
concerning the home unit. The home regulator under both representation forms can access foreign
residual assets. Diﬀerences in decisions uniquely come from the home regulator’s responsibility
for foreign depositors in a branch MNB. In this case the (expected) cost of foreign failure for the
regulator is (1 − pf) when she intervenes in the home unit, and (1 − pf)[(1− ph)+ph(2 − R)]
when she does not. As intervention is more costly than no intervention, the home unit faces softer
regulation in branch than in subsidiary represented MNBs.14 T h e s eg i v eu st h eﬁrst statement in
Proposition 4.15
Turning to the foreign unit, we know that the foreign regulator of a subsidiary cannot expect
any assets from the home unit. Consequently, her decision does not depend on the prospects of
t h eh o m eu n i tph. Thus, she simply compares the expected cost saving from no intervention in the
foreign unit pf with its liquidation value L.
The home regulator’s behavior towards the branch, however, is shaped by two considerations :
the possibility of reducing foreign losses with home assets and the possibility of subsidizing home
losses with foreign assets. The ﬁrst eﬀect pushes the regulator to be tougher, while the second
eﬀect to be softer on the foreign unit. The balance of these two eﬀects changes with the prospects
for the home unit (i.e. with ph). When ph is small, intervention is likely at home and the prevailing
eﬀect is the latter, making the home regulator softer on the foreign unit. As ph increases, the
former eﬀect becomes stronger, ultimately making the home regulator tougher on the branch.
Choice of representation form Proposition 4 gives clear indications of an MNB’s preference
over organizational form. When the home unit is not suﬃciently safe (i.e. ph ≤ max{L,1/2}), the
bank prefers to set up a branch for its foreign operations. The intuition is that the banker has a
bias for continuation. Only in this case the MNB might pay proﬁts. Further, he knows that he can
expect softer regulation for both units under branch rather than subsidiary representation.
When the home unit is relatively safe (i.e. ph > max{L,1/2}), countervailing forces aﬀect the
banker’s representation choice. In our model a branch MNB always enjoys more lenient regulation
14This can abe veriﬁed by noticing that in ﬁgure 1 and 2 the two boundaries ϕh and δh take the same value for
pf =1and ϕh >δ h for any other value of pf.
15When ph is suﬃciently large, intervention is optimal with any representation. For ph is suﬃciently small, no
intervention is preferred. For intermediate values of ph intervention occurs under subsidiary but not under branch
representation. This explains the "weakly" qualiﬁer in the text of the Proposition.
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relatively safe home unit. This diﬀerence in favour of the subsidiary increases as the home unit
gets safer. A simple inspection of Figures 1 and 2 show how safety diﬀerences between the two
units alter regulatory behavior depending on the representation form: if pf ≥ ph t h eh o m eu n i t
faces tougher regulation if the MNB is represented by a subsidiary, while the foreign unit faces the
same decision irrespective of the representation form. If pf ≤ ph t h eh o m eu n i tf a c e st h es a m e
decision for both forms while the branch is subject to tougher regulation than a subsidiary. Branch
representation is, therefore, preferred when the foreign project is safer than the home project while
subsidiary representation is preferred when the home project is safer.
Corollary 1 (Bank’s Choice of Representation) If the home project is not suﬃciently safe
(i.e. ph ≤ max{L,1/2}) the banker prefers branch representation. If, however, the home project
is suﬃciently safe, and safer than the foreign one (i.e. pf ≤ ph), the banker prefers subsidiary
representation. She prefers branch representation otherwise.
A “single passport” scheme exists in Europe (EEC, 1989), which attempts to limit protec-
tive barriers to entry by allowing any home EU bank to establish branches elsewhere in the EU.
Notwithstanding this legislation, many banks have preferred expansion via subsidiaries within the
EU (Dermine, 2002). Similarly, subsidiaries of EU and US banks dominate in both Latin America
and Eastern Europe, where banks have a free choice between branch and subsidiary structure.
Clearly, our stylized model fails to consider other important factors in banks’ representation choice
(see Ursacki and Vertinsky 1992 and Blandon 1999). However, it still provides an explanation for
such behavior if we assume that banks originating from the EU and the US hold a quite safe portfo-
lio of projects at home and that projects available in Latin America and Eastern Europe on average
are less safe. Further, branches are more common within Asia. There is also evidence suggesting
that Asian banks prefer branches for expansion outside Asia.16 This follows our prediction that
branches are more common when the home investment is not suﬃciently safe.
Project selection In the base model the bank is active at t =0in both countries because
the information available at the investment stage optimally induces this scenario. It immediately
follows that if a bank prefers to be active in both countries (thus being a MNB), then independent
of the representation form, it undertakes safer projects (i.e. projects with higher probability of
success) than a national bank, being active in only one of the two countries. The shared liability
between a MNB’s units reduces the intervention cost for the regulator. This leads to tougher
behavior than that would be implied by limited liability between units. Hence, the bank chooses
to be a MNB uniquely if the probabilities of success in both projects are high enough.17 Extending
this argument we see that with subsidiary representation the foreign unit undertakes safer projects
than the home one (with branch-MNB decisions being symmetric). Moreover, comparing the two
16Japanese banks, for example, seemingly preferred branches in their expansion into the US and the EU. See the
BIS Report (2001) on the activities of multinational banks in emerging markets.
17This holds true a fortiori if the bank owned funds to run risky projects.
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projects than branch representation.
4 R e g u l a t i o nw i t hb a n k ’ sl o b b y i n g
Each regulator i m a ya l s oc a r ea b o u tt h eM N B ’ sp r o ﬁt, attributing a weight αi to the total MNB’s
proﬁt. This can occur for several reasons. The weight αi may relate to proﬁts paid by the bank
to local citizens and to their (partial) ownership of the bank. Successful lobbying activity may
induce the regulator to watch over the MNB’s proﬁts (particularly in cases of imperfect delegation
to regulators with private agendas).18 Finally, a MNB’s earnings may be relevant when the local
banking sector is ﬁnancially unstable.
Clearly, with branch representation, a larger weight on the MNB’s proﬁts unambiguously in-
duces the home regulator to be softer towards both units. When the home regulator is more
concerned about the MNB’s proﬁts, the areas with corresponding decisions (I,I), (O,I) and (I,O)
shrink, while area (O,O) enlarges.
With subsidiary representation, when the foreign regulator cares about the MNB’s proﬁts, her
decision is aﬀected by the home regulator’s decision. Intervention in any of the MNB units results
in no proﬁt. Thus, no intervention at home induces the foreign regulator to be softer (i.e. intervene
for a smaller set of parameters); a strategy that enables him to beneﬁtf r o mt h eM N B ’ sp r o ﬁt. The
home regulator, though, behaves tougher when the foreign regulator is softer (i.e. she does not
intervene in the foreign unit), as long as she cares more about closure costs than the MNB’s proﬁts
(i.e. αh < 1).
Thus, with a subsidiary-MNB and proﬁt weights αh < 1 and αf > 0, the regulators’ decisions
cyclically aﬀect each other. Assume, for example, that the home regulator prefers to intervene in
the home unit. This induces the foreign regulator to intervene in the foreign unit, which, in turn,
may make the home regulator change her decision to non-intervention. The cyclical pattern means
that a pure strategy equilibrium for intermediate values of ph and pf cannot exist.
I f ,h o w e v e r ,t h ep r o ﬁtw e i g h ta r es u c ht h a tαh > 1 and αf > 0, then each regulator’s decision
reinforces the same decision by the other regulator. This implies that the no-pure strategy equilibria
region vanishes, and a region with multiple equilibria appears where both regulators decide to
intervene or not for the same set of parameters. The determining factor is the ‘other’ regulator’s
decision.19
The following Proposition summarizes how proﬁt weights aﬀect regulators’ strategies.
Proposition 5 (Eﬀect of Proﬁts on Regulation) (i) A larger αh induces softer regulators’
strategies, both under subsidiary and branch representation. (ii) If αh < 1, al a r g e rαf induces
18Grossman and Helpman (1994), Feenstra and Lewis (1991) and Calzolari (2004) use this interpretation for
regulators’ proﬁt weighting in social welfare functions. Here we do not consider the possibility that regulators assign
diﬀerent weights to proﬁts earned in diﬀerent countries.
19These eﬀects leading to either a multiple-equilibria region or a region with no pure strategies for intermediate
values of ph and pf. Otherwise, both regulators would either prefer to intervene or not to intervene at all, independent
of their counterpart’s decision.
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induces softer regulatory decisions for both representation forms.
As one would expect, any regulator is softer when she values the bank’s proﬁts more. Less
obvious, however, is how this softer behavior may aﬀect the other regulator under subsidiary rep-
resentation. A lager αf increases the no-pure-strategy region by reducing the (O,I) region. This
means that a decision to keep the home unit open may reverse as is the case when αh < 1.
As for the comparison of regulation between branches and subsidiaries, consider the case where
the foreign regulator only cares about her intervention costs (i.e. αf =0 ). A suﬃciently large αh
may induce the home regulator to be softer than the foreign one, inverting Proposition 1. Further,
as long as αf =0 , proﬁt weighting by the home regulator does not qualitatively aﬀect Proposition
4. This is no longer the case when the foreign regulator also cares for the MNB’s proﬁt( i . e .αf > 0),
the reason being the no-pure-strategy equilibria region which makes comparisons ambiguous.
This additional concern for proﬁts may also aﬀect our results with regard to information.
Propositions 2 can no longer be stated as such due to multiple equilibria and the no-pure strategies
equilibria. However, one can look at how a given decision by one regulator aﬀects the other. Similar
to the base model we ﬁnd that (i) favorable information on a given unit makes the regulator in
charge softer towards the unit; (ii) as long as αh < 1 (both in branch and subsidiary forms), the
home regulator responds with tougher behavior to better news from the foreign unit. This result
ﬂips in case she puts a larger weight on the proﬁt than the closure costs.
5 International fund shifting and regulation
We now modify our base model. Let bank managers have an active role and interests aligned
with shareholders. We look at the MNBs’ ability to shift internal resources across countries and
assume this can happen in the absence of any regulatory intervention. More precisely, at t =1 .5
the manager privately learns whether a project is good or bad. A good project yields intermediate
returns r at t =1 .5, along with ﬁnal returns R at t =2 . A bad project can be reﬁnanced at
t =1 .5,s ot h a ti tp a y sﬁnal returns R at t =2with probability q<p i, and zero returns if it is not
reﬁnanced.20 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the cost of reﬁnancing is r. Finally, as in
the base model, if a regulator intervenes on a project, the liquidation value is L independent of the
project type.
While internal resource shifting may be optimal for shareholders, it may be socially ineﬃcient.
Our analysis becomes interesting exactly when this is the case so that we will assume qR − r<
L. As in the base model we continue to assume both that projects have a positive NPV (i.e.
p(r + R)+( 1− p)L>1 with R>1) and that depositors cannot be reimbursed in both countries
if at least one project is liquidated (i.e. r + R + L<2).
20Unsuccessful projects here have a "second" chance which is conditional on internal resource shifting. Note that
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information problem as in the base model, and the ring-fencing pursued with intervention at t =1
prevents the manager from shifting resources across units.
Consider the case when no regulatory intervention takes place at t =1 . T h en e x tl e m m a
summarizes the bankers’ behavior under the two organizational forms.
Lemma 1 (MNB Decision on Reﬁnancing Bad Projects) A branch-MNB always reﬁnances
a bad project; A subsidiary-MNB always reﬁnances a bad domestic project and reﬁnances a bad for-
eign project if and only if
q(R − 1) >r . (1)
With a branch-MNB, liquidating a bad project would not yield suﬃcient funds to repay all
depositors even if the other project is good. Since units are jointly liable under branch represen-
tation, the entire MNB will fail and shareholders get zero payoﬀ. Instead, if the banker gambles,
the bank might rebound and its shareholders receive a positive payoﬀ. Thus, it is always optimal
for the manager to gamble.21 In subsidiary MNBs the banker treats a bad project at home and
abroad diﬀerently. If the home project is bad, the banker faces the same incentives as before. As
the foreign unit is liable for the home unit’s unsettled claims, the only way to avoid foreign failure
is to gamble as well. Since, the home unit is shielded from foreign losses, the banker will reﬁnance
a bad foreign project only if the expected net return q(R − 1) exceeds the injected resources r.
How does ineﬃc i e n tr e s o u r c es h i f t i n gi m p a c tr e g u l a t i o n? In what follows we assume that condi-
tion (1) is satisﬁed so that bad projects are always reﬁnanced, regardless of the representation form
and project location. This avoids diﬀerences in regulations that are driven by banker’s behavior.
Let us consider ﬁrst subsidiary MNBs. The foreign regulator becomes softer when no interven-
tion occurs in the home unit and she has no longer a dominant decision. Indeed, no intervention at
home enables the bank to shift resources from a successful home unit to reﬁnance an unsuccessful
foreign unit, so that the foreign regulator might not incur any cost.
The bank manager’s gambling has an ambiguous eﬀect on the home regulator. She does not
have to incur any cost if the gamble pays out. However, gambling reduces the available residual
assets from the other unit by r. Recall that in the base model a larger pf induces the home
regulator to be tougher. This means that a larger ph is required to oﬀset the eﬀect of a larger pf
(i.e. boundary δh is increasing). This is also the case when q and r are small.
If r is large, then a good project has procured more intermediate resources which can be lost
through shifting/gambling. A larger pf then more strongly aﬀects the home regulator’s payoﬀ from
intervention. Thus, we have that a larger r makes δh more positively related to ph (i.e. larger ph
is required to oﬀset increases in pf). On the contrary, a larger probability of success q means that
ar e ﬁnanced bad home project succeeds with a greater probability. Hence, the payoﬀ of decision O
for the home unit is increased by a larger q so that function δh becomes less positively related to
ph, possibly even becoming a negative function of it.22 In this latter case, good news on the foreign
21Since the branch organization pools assets and liabilities of the two units, the banker treats a bad project the
same, independent of its location.
22I nt h eA p p e n d i xw es h o wt h a tδh is decreasing in ph if L(R − 1) + r ≤ q(2 − R)(1− L).
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of ph and pf, softer foreign regulation results in softer home regulation and vice versa. A region of
multiple equilibria again appears with decisions (I,I) and (O,O).
When q is small and r is large, δh becomes an increasing function of ph (i.e. L(R − 1) >
q(2 − R)(1− L) − r) and softer foreign regulation leads to tougher home regulation. However,
softer home regulation results in softer foreign regulation (the foreign regulator beneﬁts from the
home unit if she lets the MNB gamble). Hence, similar to Section 4, the model generates the
possibility of no-pure strategy equilibria for intermediate values of ph and pf.
With a branch-MNB, the home regulator faces a similar trade-oﬀ to that of the home regulator
in subsidiary MNBs. However, due to her deposit insurer function in both countries she is more
likely to beneﬁt from gambling than the home regulator of a subsidiary MNB, i.e. ϕi (i = f,h)
becomes a decreasing function of pj for a larger set of parameters.
Proposition 6 (Eﬀect of International Funds Shifting on Regulation) (i) A larger q and
as m a l l e rr induce softer home regulation under both representation forms and softer regulation of
the foreign branch. (ii) The foreign subsidiary receives softer regulation when q is large and the
home unit is kept open.
We can conclude that regulation of the home unit remains softer in branch than in subsidiary
MNBs. The softer behavior in branch MNBs comes from responsibility to depositors in both
countries. The foreign unit, however, diﬀers with respect to the base model in that the foreign
regulator’s optimal decision is now a function of the home regulator’s decision. Regulation of the
foreign unit may diﬀer among representation forms according to the net gain from gambling, and
the diﬀerent responsibility towards depositors located in the other country. When the home unit is
open, regulation of the foreign unit is tougher under branch than under subsidiary representation.
Thus, our base model result carries over. This follows from the diﬀerent access capability to home
assets in the absence of gambling for the home regulator (in branches) and for the foreign regulator
(in subsidiaries). When the home unit is open under branch but not under subsidiary MNBs,
for large q and small r, intervention is less likely in the foreign unit under branches, as the home
regulator in branch MNBs is likely to beneﬁt from the bank’s resource shifting.
6 Information acquisition
In this ﬁnal section we investigate regulators’ incentives to acquire information on the units’
prospects. We do this by adding an information acquisition stage to the base model. More precisely,
before deciding whether to intervene in t =1 , each regulator can pay a cost c to obtain a signal and
update the prospects on the unit she regulates.23 We assume that signals are perfectly informative
so that once information has been acquired on project i, then either pi =1or pi =0 . Finally, at
the intervention stage t =1 , all available information is truthfully shared by the regulators.
23For the sake of simplicity, a regulator has not the authority to investigate a unit for which she is not responsible.
Equivalently, the cost of such information is excessively large.
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i n f o r m a t i o no naf o r e i g nb r a n c hc a nb ee x t r e m e l yd i ﬃcult and signals may be far from perfect. Fur-
thermore, since regulators’ interests most likely diﬀer, they may try to conceal relevant information.
Nevertheless, we believe our simpliﬁed information game can shed some light on regulators’ moni-
toring incentives. In fact, the advantage that national authorities have in acquiring information on
local activities is partially captured by costs that are diﬀerentiated by location of the investigated
unit and the investigating regulator. Further, credibility is invaluable for bank regulators, dras-
tically limiting their willingness to conceal or misrepresent information. Regulators, in fact, are
more likely to strategically delay acquiring local information, in case this aﬀects other regulators’
behavior in a desirable manner. We believe that delays in information acquisition is crucial in
drawing a balance between centralized and decentralized MNB supervision.
We deﬁne the value of information on a given unit as the diﬀerence between the regulator’s
expected payoﬀ with and without the information. We can then prove the following result:
Proposition 7 (MNB Representation and Information Acquisition) (i) Under subsidiary
representation, the value of information is larger for the foreign regulator than for the home regu-
lator. The former has more incentives to monitor.
(ii) Information is more valuable when the MNB is branch rather than subsidiary represented.
Results from Proposition 7 are presented in Figure 3. This Figure describes diﬀerent monitoring
decisions for diﬀerent values of the ex-ante success probability p of the projects and the cost
of information acquisition c. The bold lines represent the value of information with subsidiary
representation and, together with c, identify regions associated with diﬀerent monitoring decisions.
Thin lines (partially overlapping the bold lines) identify those regions of branch representation.
Note that, information is most valuable for intermediate values of p.24 Moreover, for low values of
p, the optimal decision is to intervene. The value of information here is therefore increasing in p
both for subsidiary and branch representation. In fact, the role of information acquisition here is
to save intervention costs when the investigated project turns out to be successful (i.e. a "type-
1" error is avoided). Clearly, these gains are larger the larger is p. However, when p is high, such
that the decision at t =1is not to intervene, valuable information may reveal that the project is
unsuccessful (thus avoiding a "type-2" error). In this case, the value of information is increasing in
(1 − p) and decreasing in p.
Consider ﬁrst subsidiary representation. Recall that the foreign regulator at t =1has a
dominant strategy (intervene if and only if pf ≤ L) and that her decision is unaﬀected by the
information available on the home subsidiary. If she monitors, she can save p(1 − L) for p ≤ L
(discovering a successful project she thought would fail) and L(1 − p) for p>L(discovering a
24Indeed, if the prior p is either very small or very large, both regulators know that the information obtained with
monitoring is easily predictable.
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her foreign counterpart’s decision at t =1will not depend on the information available to date on
the home project. Hence, the decision whether or not to monitor the home subsidiary at t =0is
not aﬀected by any inﬂuence over the foreign regulator’s decision at t =1 . This implies that none
of the regulators engages in strategic monitoring.
A second important feature in monitoring subsidiary-MNBs is that the home regulator perceives
foreign monitoring as a substitute for home monitoring. Indeed, the value of information for the
home regulator is smaller when the foreign regulator monitors her unit. To understand this, assume
that p ≤ L so that each regulator intervenes at t =1 . The value of information for home regulator
is clearly p(1 − L) if the foreign regulator does not monitor. If the foreign regulator does monitor,
however, the home regulator knows that she can seize residual assets if the foreign project is
found to be good, and kept open. In this case, the value of information to the home regulator
is (1 − p)[−1+L + p(R − 1)] − [−1+L + p(R − 1)]. Hence, expected foreign residual assets are
ex-ante more valuable to a home regulator who does not monitor. If she does monitor she can
obtain these assets only if she discovers that the home unit will fail, so that ex-ante the assets value
(1− p)p(R − 1) instead of p(R −1) with no monitoring. Hence, the value of information turns out
to be p(1 − L) − p2(R − 1), smaller than the value when the foreign regulator does not monitor.
This reasoning extends to when p>L ,and clearly relates to the information eﬀect discussed in
Section 2. Monitoring has a similar eﬀect to discovering that the home project is safer, implying
that the home regulator can expect less resources from abroad.25
This reasoning does not apply to the monitoring incentives of the foreign regulator, as she
cannot seize any residual assets from the home unit and her incentives to monitor are unaﬀected
by home monitoring activity. Moreover, the ability to seize residual assets from the foreign unit
reduces the value of information for the home regulator. This holds true for any foreign monitoring
decision (our previous discussion shows that this eﬀect is stronger when the foreign regulator does
rather than does not monitor). This clearly implies not only that foreign monitoring substitutes
for home monitoring, but also that the foreign regulator has stronger incentives to monitor than
the home counterpart (she is unable to recover residual assets from the home unit), as stated in
result (i) of Proposition 7.
Monitoring certain units can also act as a substitute for monitoring others also in branch-
MNBs. Hence, with this representation form as well there are parameters conﬁgurations such that
the (home) regulator prefers to monitor only one of the two units (see in Figure 3 regions deﬁned
by thin lines).
Part (ii) of Proposition 7 compares monitoring between the two representation forms. Figure
3 shows that either monitoring activities coincide with branch and subsidiary representation or
a branch-MNB is subject to more intense monitoring. When comparing the two representation
25The complete argument is complicated by the eﬀect foreign monitoring has on home regulator’s decision at t =1 .
Clearly, when the home regulator monitors, her decision at t =1is unaﬀected by the information available on the
foreign unit. When she does not monitor, her decision at t =1depends on pf, as we have discussed in Proposition
2. However, we know that discovering a high (low) pf induces tougher (softer) home regulation and this reinforces
the substitutability eﬀect of foreign monitoring on home monitoring.
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level of information, the decisions at t =1coincide for the two representation forms. We can
identify two eﬀects. First, the larger are (residual) assets a regulator may expect from other units,
the smaller is the value of information (a shared liability eﬀect). Clearly, this eﬀect is stronger
under branch representation than subsidiary. Second, with branch representation the regulator
in charge centralizes the monitoring decisions and internalizes all possible gains from monitoring,
thus increasing its value (an internalization eﬀect). Result (ii) states that the second eﬀect always
prevails over the ﬁrst one. To see this, consider again the case with a low value of p, i.e. p ≤ L/R.
For this case, independent of representation, the regulator in charge intervenes on a given unit
at t =1 , unless she monitors at t =0 . For the home regulator of a branch-MNB, the value of
information on a given unit is p(R − L) when she decides not to monitor the other unit. Indeed,
this is what she can save by monitoring and then deciding not to intervene on that unit when
she realizes that its project is successful. With subsidiary-MNB, the value of information for both
regulators when the counterpart does not monitor is p(1 − L) (≤ p(R − L)).26 Now, consider a
case where the foreign unit is kept open. In branch-MNBs, the value of information on the home
unit is now p(R − L) − 2p2(R − 1). For subsidiary-MNB it is now p(1 − L) − p2(R − 1) and we
have two countervailing eﬀects at play. With branch representation, the negative eﬀect of shared
liability on the value of information (second term in the two above expressions) is larger, as well
as the positive internalization eﬀect (ﬁrst term in the two expressions). The latter systematically
outweighs the former eﬀect as Proposition 7 states. We have applied this reasoning assuming that,
for the same level of information, regulators’ decisions at t =1coincide for the two representations.
However, as emphasized in Proposition 4, decisions need not coincide with the two representation
forms for the same level of information. This introduces an additional eﬀe c tt h a tc o m p l i c a t e st h e
analysis, which, as proven in the appendix, reinforces the higher value of information with branch
rather than with subsidiary representation.27
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we analyze regulation of a multinational bank with a very simple and stylized model.
However, our setting turns out to be versatile enough to deal with several important issues of MNBs
regulation.
We show that diﬀerent organizational or representation forms generate very diﬀerent regulatory
responses for the same level of information. We argue that the liability structure between bank
units and regulator’s responsibility towards foreign depositors induced by a particular representation
form play a crucial role in explaining these diﬀerences. We ﬁnd that the information available on a
26Here only the second eﬀect is at play as there are no residual assets expected from the other unit.
27With a branch-MNB there is complementarity in monitoring if αh ≥ 1. In general, with the extensions of the base
model discussed in Sections 4 and 5, the monitoring analysis becomes cumbersome. Interestingly, we have veriﬁed
that more monitoring may take place with subsidiary than with branch thus reversing result (ii) in the Proposition.
In this case, an additional eﬀect is the possibility regulators strategically decide to monitor (or not to monitor) to
aﬀect the other regulator’s decision at t =1 .
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more intervention when better prospects become known. In subsidiary MNBs the home regulator
is tougher than the foreign one, and independently of representation no intervention in a unit tends
to induce tougher regulation on the other unit. Branch representation leads to softer regulation for
the home unit than subsidiary representation, while regulation of the foreign unit can be softer or
tougher depending on the prospect of the home unit. With these indications concerning regulatory
attitude towards the two representation forms, our model also provides some indications about the
banker’s preferences over the representation form.
In our base model regulators minimize intervention cost, arising from their deposit insurance
function. We extend this setting, allowing regulators to care also about the MNB’s proﬁts (due
for example to lobbying activity by the MNBs), and introduce the possibility of ineﬃcient bank
gambling or international resource shifting. We ﬁnd a rich sets of results in a subsidiary setup,
where depending on the proﬁt weights (and on the desirability of gambling from the regulator’s
point of view) regulators’ decision may either reinforce or cyclically aﬀect each other.
Finally, we study regulators’ monitoring activity and show that with subsidiary representation
the foreign regulator has more incentives to monitor than the home regulator and incentives to
monitor are maximal with a branch in comparison with a subsidiary MNB.
Our understanding of the complex issues concerning the regulation of MNBs is still rudimen-
tary and in this paper we have mainly performed a positive analysis in a very stylized model.
Understanding the way MNBs act and the regulatory responses is a ﬁrst step for a more ambitious
normative analysis on the socially optimal organization and regulation of MNBs. This is left for
future research.
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A p p e n d i x
In this appendix we will refer to regulators’ decisions with di ∈ {I,O},w h e r edi = I means that
the regulator in charge of unit i intervenes on that unit and di = O t h a ts h el e a v e si to p e n . B y
convention, the ﬁrst letter in any pair of decisions (d,d0) will refer to project h and the second to
project f,i . e .f o r(d,d0) we have dh = d and df = d0.
Proof of Proposition 1. For this proof we ﬁrst need an intermediate Lemma.
Lemma 2 In subsidiary MNBs there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in the regulation
game. The equilibrium decisions are described by the following non empty regions in the probabilities
space (ph,p f) ∈ [0,1]
2 ,
(I,I) ≡ {pi ≤ L,i = h,f} (O,O) ≡ {ph >δ h,p f >L }
(O,I) ≡ {ph >L≥ pf} (I,O) ≡ {δh ≥ ph,p f >L }
where δh ≡ L
1−pf(R−1).
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . The following matrix represents the normal form representation of the
t =1regulation game (in each cell the top payoﬀ relates to the foreign regulator and the bottom
to the home regulator).










−(1 − ph)[pf(1 − (R − 1)) + (1 − pf)]
As for the payoﬀs in the cell associated to decisions (O,O), if the home project fails (with probability
(1−ph)) and the foreign project succeeds (probability pf), the home regulator can recover some of
her costs. In fact, in case the home project fails, the home regulator is entitled to all the foreign
assets left after foreign depositors are reimbursed (R−1), and bears a cost of 1−(R−1). Foreign
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the foreign regulator cannot expect any resources from the mother bank..
Necessary conditions for a pair of decisions to be a (pure strategies) Nash equilibrium can be
now simply derived from the previous matrix. Uniqueness is guaranteed by the foreign regulator
having a dominant strategy. Finally, we need to check that all the regions associated with diﬀerent
pair of decisions are non empty. δh = L
1−pf(R−1) takes value L/(2−R) with L<L / (2−R) < 1 for
pf =1so that regions (I,O) and (O,O) are non empty. Regions (I,I) and (O,I) are trivially non
empty. This concludes the proof of the Lemma.
We can now go back to the statement of the Proposition. One has simply to verify how the two
regulators act when ph = pf, i.e. along the 45◦ line in ﬁgure 1. As long as ph = pf ≤ L the both
prefer to intervene on the local unit. Moreover, boundary δh takes value L at pf =0 ,t a k e sv a l u e
L/(2 − R) with L ≤ L/(2 − R) ≤ 1 at pf =1and ﬁnally it is an increasing function of pf. Hence,
δh crosses the 45◦ line once. This suﬃces to show that there are values of ph and pf with ph = pf
such that equilibrium decisions are (I,O). Finally, for the remaining values ph = pf equilibrium
decisions are (O,O).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . F i r s tn o t et h a tδh is an increasing function of pf. On the contrary,
all the other boundaries deﬁning the regions with diﬀerent decisions in Lemma 2 do not depend
on ph nor on pf. Hence, the proof can be obtained from simple inspection of Figure 1. Fixing the
level of pi and increasing pj with i,j = h,f and i 6= j, one can check how regulators decisions are
adapted to signals that aﬀect the probability of success of any project.
Proof of Proposition 3.
For this proof we ﬁrst need an intermediate Lemma.
Lemma 3 The optimal decisions are described by the following non empty regions in the probabil-




R ≥ pi,i= h,f
ª















,ϕ h ≥ ph
ª
where ϕi ≡ L
R−2(R−1)pj.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . At t =1 , the home regulator’s payoﬀs associated to available decisions
a r es u m m a r i z e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l e .
df = I df = O
dh = I −2(1− L) −(1 − L)+pf(R − 1) − (1 − pf)
dh = O −(1 − L)+ph(R − 1) − (1 − ph)
−[(1 − ph)pf +( 1− pf)ph](2− R)+
−(1 − ph)(1− pf)2
Decisions (I,O) or (O,I) correspond to intervention in one of the units of the bank at t =1 . If the
regulator intervenes in unit i, the MNB will be unable to payback depositor at t =2(Assumption
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a successful project (with probability pj), the total assets of the bank will be R + L<2.T h u s ,
the regulator incurs a cost of 2 − (R + L). On the contrary, if unit j ends up in a bad state (with
probability 1 − pj), the bank’s total assets will be L from unit i. When both units are allowed
to proceed, the regulator has to reimburse all depositors if both projects turn to be bad, with
an expected cost equal to (1 − ph)(1− pf)2. Alternatively, one of the two project may turn to
succeed while the other fails (with probability (1 − pi)pj). In this case the regulator’s cost amounts
to (2 − R).
>From these payoﬀs on can simply calculate the boundaries L/R and ϕi ≡ L
R−2(R−1)pj for
probabilities ph and pf that give rise to the regions in the Lemma.
We now show that the regions in the Lemma are non empty. Consider ﬁrst decision (I,I). For
this decision to be optimal it must be that −2(1− L) ≥−(1 − L)+pi(R−1)−(1−pi) for i = h,f
and −2(1− L) ≥− [(1 − ph)pf +( 1− pf)ph](2− R) − (1 − ph)(1− pf)2. However, this second
condition is implied by the ﬁr s ts ot h a ti ti ss i m p l yn e e d e dt h a tpi ≤ L
R. Moreover, region (I,I) is
non-empty because L<R . For decision (O,I) to be optimal it must be that the payoﬀ associated
to (I,I) is smaller, i.e. ph > L
R, as well as that associated to (O,O), i.e. pf ≤ ϕf = L
R−2(R−1)ph and
that associated with (I,O), i.e. ph ≥ pf. By symmetry, for decision (I,O) to be optimal it must
be pf > L
R, ph ≤ ϕh = L
R−2(R−1)pf and ph ≤ pf Moreover, note that the condition ph ≤ ϕh can




h and ϕf are both increasing and may intersect




4(R−1) if the discriminant in c± is positive, i.e. L ≤ R2
8(R−1). This is always
the case because L + R ≤ 2 by assumption 2 (ii) which also implies that c+ > 1 and then the two
curves ϕ0
h and ϕf intersect only once in the [0,1]2 space of probabilities (ph,p f).
Finally, regions do not intersect so that there is no indiﬀerence for decisions except along the
45◦ degrees lines where either the decisions are the same, or, otherwise, the regulator is indiﬀerent
between (I,O) and (O,I). This concludes the proof of the Lemma.
We can now go back to the statement of the Proposition. The proof is based on the analysis
of the boundaries deﬁning the optimal decision which are presented in Lemma 3. Clearly, with
respect to the boundary L/R a higher (lower) pi can only induce a decision change from di = I to
di = O, if any. On the contrary, ϕi is increasing in pj and this implies that with a higher pj the
home regulator needs to face a higher pi in order to take decision di = O. Hence, ceteris paribus,
if a change of pj aﬀects the home regulator’s decision at all it induces a change from di = O to
di = I.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . For the same values of the parameters, we need to compare the
decisions that the home and the foreign regulator would take with subsidiary or branch represen-
tation. Note ﬁrst that ϕh and ϕf cross each other at ph = c− (Proof of Lemma 3) which is smaller
than L iﬀ L<1/2. Furthermore, ϕf = L for ph =1 /2, with ϕf increasing in ph.
Case L ≤ 1/2. Consider ﬁrst decisions concerning the home unit. For pf ≥ L decisions coincide
with the two representation forms except for ph ∈ [δh,ϕ h] where the home unit is intervened with
subsidiary and kept open with branch representation. For pf <L ,note that L ≤ 1/2 implies
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(I,I) for subsidiary-MNB. Hence, either decisions coincide with the two representations or, if
pf ≤ max{ph,ϕ h} and ph ∈ [L/R,L],t h e ya r eO and I respectively for branch- and subsidiary-
MNB
Consider now decisions for the foreign unit. For ph ≥ 1/2, so that ϕf ≥ L, either the foreign
unit is kept open for both representations or the decision is I and O respectively for branch and




.O n t h e c o n t r a r y , f o r ph < 1/2 either decisions coincide for









for any ph ∈ [L/R,L], and if pf ∈ [L/R,L] for any ph <L / R .
Case L>1/2. Note that L>1/2 implies ϕh and ϕf cross each other in the area {pi >L ,i= h,f} .
Consider decisions concerning the home unit. For pf ≥ L decisions coincide with the two represen-
tation forms except for ph ∈ [min{δh,p f},ϕ h] where the home unit is intervened with subsidiary
a n dk e p to p e nw i t hb r a n c hr e p r e s e n t a t i o n .F o rpf <L ,either the home unit is intervened with the
two representations or, if pf ≤ ph and ph ∈ [L/R,L],d e c i s i o n sa r eO and I respectively for branch-
and subsidiary-MNB
Consider now decisions for the foreign unit. For ph ≥ L, so that ϕf ≥ L, either the foreign
unit is kept open for both representations or the decision is I and O respectively for branch and






. On the contrary, for ph <Leither decisions coincide
for both representations, or the decision is I and O respectively for subsidiary and branch-MNB if
pf ∈ [max{L/R,ph},L].
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) Consider ﬁrst subsidiary representation.L e tδi be the boundary such that for pi ≥ (<)δi
regulator i keeps the local unit alive (intervenes on it) if the other regulator does not intervene
on the other unit. We have δh = L
1−(R−1)[pf(1−αh)−αh] increasing in pf as long as αh ≤ 1 and
δf = L
1+(R−1)phαf decreasing in ph and smaller than L for any αf > 0. Similarly, let δ0
i be the
boundary such that for pi ≥ (<)δ0
i regulator i keeps the local unit alive (intervenes on it) if the
other regulator intervenes on the other unit. We have that δ0
h = L
1+(R−1)αh <Lfor any αh > 0 and
δ0
f = L.
This shows that if αh < 1, then δ0
h ≤ δh and δh is increasing in pf; if αf > 0, then δf ≤ δ0
f and












such that there are no pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, if αh > 1 then δ0
h >δ h and δh is












with multiple equilibria (I,I) and (O,O).
Now, if αf =0 , the no-pure-strategies-equilibria area is empty. In this case a larger αh reduces
both δh and δ0
h so that the result applies: if decisions are aﬀected, they are turned either from (I,O)
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(R−1)phpf(1−αh)2 > 0 where the sign comes from the fact that in the no-
pure-strategies area we have ph ≥ L
1+(R−1)αh which implies that Rph ≥ L because L
1+(R−1)αh ≥ L
R.
Hence, in this case the reasoning discussed for αf =0applies and, in addition, a larger αh (weakly)
increases the probability that in the mixed strategy equilibrium an open decision is taken by a
given regulator. Finally, with αh ≥ 1 al a r g e rαh increases the multiple equilibria region and this
obtains by reducing the region with a decision (I,I).
Consider now branch representation. Studying the eﬀect of αh on the boundaries deﬁning
the regions associated with diﬀerent decisions simply gives the result. In fact, we now have,
ϕi ≡
L
R − 2(R − 1)pj (1 − αh)
and ϕi is increasing in pj as long as αh ≤ 1 and decreasing otherwise. Moreover,
∂ϕi
∂αh ≥ 0 for 1 ≥ αh
and
∂ϕi
∂αh ≤ 0 for 1 <α h.
(ii) Clearly, αf matters uniquely with subsidiary representation. If αh < 1, for any αf > 0 the
no-pure-strategy-equilibrium region is non empty. This region is larger and the region with decisions
(O,I) is smaller, the larger is αf whilst all the other regions are unaﬀected. Hence, we have that a
pure strategy equilibrium with decisions (O,I) is substituted by a mixed strategy equilibrium whose
realization can be any pair of decisions. So, if decisions are aﬀected, the home regulator becomes
tougher and the foreign regulator becomes softer. Moreover, we have that ∂σh
∂αf < 0 and
∂σf
∂αf =0 .
Hence, the larger αf the less probable is that the home regulator leaves the home unit open in the
mixed strategy equilibrium. Finally, if αh ≥ 1, the no-pure-strategies-equilibrium region is empty
and inspection of the boundaries that deﬁne the regions gives the result. In fact, either a decisions
(O,I) are transformed into (O,O) or decisions (I,I) are transformed into (O,O).
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is trivial and omitted.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Consider ﬁrst a subsidiary-MNB. Let δi and δ0
i be the boundaries







δf is decreasing in ph for any q and δh is increasing in pf if r ≥ q(2 − R)(1− L) − L(R − 1) and
decreasing otherwise. Moreover, δf ≤ δ0
f and δh ≥ δ0
h if r ≥ q(2 − R)(1− L) − L(R − 1),w h i l s t
δh ≤ δ0
h otherwise.
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with multiple equilibria (I,I) and (O,O).
Now consider the home subsidiary. We have that δh is decreasing in q and increasing in r
(whilst δ0
h is independent of the two). Hence, a larger q and a smaller r may transform equilibrium
decisions (I,O), or a mixed strategy equilibrium, or multiple equilibria (I,I) and (O,O), into the
unique pure strategy equilibrium (O,O) thus making regulation of the home unit softer.
Consider now the foreign subsidiary. As we have stated δf ≤ δ0
f, so that when the home unit
is kept open, the foreign regulator is softer with the foreign subsidiary than when the home unit is
intervened. Furthermore, r aﬀects neither δf nor δ0
f. Finally, δf is a decreasing function of q (and
δ0
f is independent of it), thus proving that a larger q induces softer foreign regulation.
We are now left with branch-MNB. The boundary functions are in this case,
ϕi ≡
L + pj [r − q(2 − R)]
R − 2pj (R − 1) + q(2 − R)(1 − 2pj)
for i,j = h,g and i 6= j. We then have that ϕi is increasing in r and decreasing in q and it is
increasing in pj i fa n do n l yi f
(r − q(2 − R))(q(2 − R)+R)+L2(q +( R − 1)(1 − q)) ≥ 0. (2)
We then have that if r ≥ q(2 − R)(1− L) − L(R − 1) is satisﬁed so that δh is increasing in pf,
then (2) is satisﬁed also so that ϕi is increasing in pj. On the contrary, the reverse is not true.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . To prove the results we need to identify, for any pattern of decisions
that is admissible when no information is available (i.e. ph = pf = p, along the 45◦ lines in Figures
1 and 2), all the cases that induce diﬀerent decisions when information is acquired at least on one
unit.
Consider ﬁrst subsidiary representation. First, for the foreign regulator we can identify
only two cases delimited by p ∈ [0,L] and p ∈ (L,1]. In the ﬁrst region the value of the information
is p(1 − L) a n di nt h es e c o n dr e g i o ni ti sL(1 − p). As for the home regulator, on the contrary,
we identify three regions: p ∈ [0,L], p ∈ (L,L/(2 − R)] and p ∈ (L/(2 − R),1] w h e r et h ev a l u eo f
information respectively is p(1−L)−p2(R−1), L−2pL+p2(2−R) and L(1−p). Moreover, being
p(1−L) ≥ p(1−L)−p2(R−1) and L(1−p) ≥ L−2pL+p2(2−R) in the relevant regions, we have
that either monitoring decisions coincide or the foreign regulator monitors and the home regulator
does not monitor.
Consider now branch-representation. The reasoning is similar as with subsidiary except for
the fact that now we have four relevant regions p ∈ [0,L/], p ∈ (L/R,c−],p∈ (c−,L/(2 − R)] and
p ∈ (L/(2−R),1] where c− is calculated in the proof of Lemma 3. The value of information on one
unit in the four regions is respectively as follows: p[R−L−2p(R−1), L(1−2p)−p2(R−2) in both
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January 2005the second and third region and L(1 − p) in the fourth region. Similarly, the value of information
acquired for both units at the same time is p(R −L), (1 −p)pR, L − p2(2 −R) and L(1 −p). This
allows to draw Figure 3 for the branch case.
Finally, the comparison of monitoring under the two representation forms simply comes from
comparing, in all the above regions, the value of information for one unit in the branch repre-
sentation with the value of information of the home regulator with subsidiary representation and,
similarly, the value of two pieces of informations in the branch case with the value of information
for the home regulator in the subsidiary case.
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Figure 1: Regulators' decisions with subsidiary-MNB 
 
(decisions of the form (home decision, foreign decision), where I=intervention, O=no intervention) 
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Figure 2: Regulator's decisions with branch-MNB 
 
(decisions of the form (home decision, foreign decision), where I=intervention, O=no intervention) 
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Figure 3: Monitoring activity, branch v/s subsidiary 
 
(bold lines for subsidiary-, thin lines for branch-  MNB) 
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Subsidary: not monitoring 
on both units 
Subsidary: foreign does, 
home does not monitor
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